Under Medicare Part D, people choose prescription drug insurance offered by many private insurers. We examine non-poor enrollees' actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data. This population substantially reduced overspending from 2006 to 2007, with the greatest improvements by those who switched plans and who overspent the most in 2006. The oldest consumers and those with Alzheimer's improved by more than average, suggesting that real-world mechanisms help overcome cognitive limitations. These gains are due to the intertwined decisions of both individual enrollees and plan providers. Consumers incorporate forward-looking information about their health and about their current plans' performance.
Introduction
Four years after its launch, Medicare Part D stands at a remarkable crossroads of the current political and academic debates. Beginning in 2006, Part D expanded Medicare beneficiaries' access to prescription drug coverage by allowing them to choose among competing private insurance plans.
The philosophy underlying this approach adopts the perspective that private competition within a regulated framework would strike the appropriate balance between cost control and providing value to consumers. Within Part D, costs are controlled through private insurers negotiating prices with pharmaceutical manufacturers in conjunction with demand-side cost sharing such as copays and the "doughnut hole." 1 At the same time, competition for enrollees would incentivize insurers to design plans that were attractive to individuals. To limit adverse selection and encourage participation, the program provided large subsidies even to non-poor beneficiaries and penalties for those who did not enroll when they became initially eligible. 2 Although many of the widely-publicized opinions of the program were initially pessimistic, the growing evidence from research on Part D is largely positive, with high participation, expanded prescription drug use, lower out-of-pocket prices for drugs, high consumer satisfaction, and total program costs below projections. 3 The most contentious remaining aspect of Part D is whether its reliance on competition between many private insurers is too complex for beneficiaries to navigate despite the program's regulation and subsidies.
Part D is an important context to study consumer choice due to the large number of lives and dollars involved. It offers an environment rich for testing theories of individual conduct that will inform policy in health care as well as other markets. Because of the age and prevalence of illness of the Medicare population, these consumers may have limited cognitive abilities. This may be compounded by the fact that prescription drug insurance plans are multiattribute, with some attributes uniform across individuals, such as premiums and deductibles, as well as individualspecific attributes due to plans' use of formularies and consumers' heterogeneous prescription drug consumption. Finally, because this was a newly-created market, all eligible beneficiaries confronted these complex choices for the first time in January, 2006. This last feature is econometrically attractive because analyzing data that include 2006 overcomes the initial condition problem raised by Heckman (1981) , allowing researchers to separate the effects of aging from the effects of experience.
Behavioral economists have reported a number of biases in consumer decision making, such as inertia and confusion, particularly when cognition is limited by age, illness, or limited attention, e.g., Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto (2009), Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and . These contributions have raised a number of academic questions about how to best model and predict human decision making. They also evoke calls for a number of regulatory reforms, such as stronger consumer protection rules and simplification of credit cards, mortgages, retirement plans and health insurance contracts. In Part D specifically, many observers have called for a reduction in the number of plans available to consumers, which ranged across regions from 27 to 52 plans available in 2006 and 45 to 66 available in 2007. 4 In fact, regulatory changes will limit the number of options that insurers can make available to consumers in 2011 Hoadley, Cubanski, Hargrave, Summer, and Neuman (2010) .
In this article we present the first evidence of how consumers' actual plan choices in Medicare Part D evolve over time. To achieve this, we analyze a large, comprehensive dataset that reports every individuals' chosen and available plans, prescription drug use and spending, and other characteristics in 2006 and 2007. Two existing articles also rely on large data sets, both finding that consumers inappropriately weight various attributes of the plans, causing them to choose less than optimally. In the first, Heiss et al. (2007) conclude that enrollees' choices can be best understood as myopic, relying on static expectations and using only current drug expenditures.
They find that beneficiaries appear to be rational in their decisions about whether to participate in Part D, but less so in their plan choices conditional on participation.
In the second article, Abaluck and Gruber (2009) conclude that enrollees show inconsistencies with optimizing behavior because they overweight some features of the plan, such as plan premiums and doughnut hole coverage, while neglecting others. They thus conclude that elders fail to make choices consistent with optimization under full information. Bolstering the conclusions of Abaluck and Gruber, Kling, Mullainathan, Shafir, Vermeulen, and Wrobel (2009) conclude that older adults suffer from serious misperceptions of prices and other features of Part D plans.
According to their evidence, misperception results in them choosing prescription plans that are substantially more expensive than available alternatives. One implication is that greater choice and 4 Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008) perhaps best summarize the mistrust in consumers' ability to choose: "health insurance is too complicated a product for most consumers to purchase intelligently," they state, concluding that, " [i] t is unlikely that most individuals will make sensible decisions when confronted with these choices." Based on these premises they suggest that either a public agency or some private company should mediate consumers' health insurance purchases. Similarly, Hoadley (2008) surveys a panel of medical experts to call for a standardization of plan benefits and formularies to make them easier to compare as well as reducing the number of plans available. Hanoch, Rice, Cummings, and Wood (2009) reached the same conclusion after analyzing the experimental evidence of 192 subjects (half of whom were age 65 or older) who performed hypothetical enrollment decisions. Duggan, Healy, and Scott-Morton (2008) , Goldman and Joyce (2008) , Joyce, Goldman, Vogt, Sun, and Jena (2009) and Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2009) are notable exceptions to the opinion of the majority of researchers in this area.
competition harms rather than improves welfare because plans can flourish by promoting confusion rather than by designing products that meet fully-informed, unbiased consumers' preferences.
These prior articles analyzed only 2006 and did not consider how consumers' actions changed over time. Yet in contrast to the often cross-sectional and typically laboratory-based evidence of common biases in consumer choice, summarized in DellaVigna (2009), other work suggests that markets and market experience ameliorate those biases, e.g., List (2003) , List (2004) , List (2006) , and List and Millimet (2008) . 5 Considering the dynamic aspects of consumer choice is important to evaluate Part D given the large degree of heterogeneity across consumers and plans as well as the related but distinct facts that this was a new market and that consumers had no previous experience in it. Furthermore, using detailed, individual-level panel data of actual choices in a complex, high stakes context will add to economists' understanding of consumer choice more broadly.
Our primary focus in this article is on whether consumers improved over time in terms of reducing overspending. We define overspending as the consumers' out-of-pocket (OOP) costs for insurance and prescription drugs above the cost of the cheapest ex post alternative, where the choice set includes no insurance and other Part D plans. Analyzing changes in this aspect of choice alone is insightful given the high persistence in an individual's drug spending over time, 6 and our use of panel data to eliminate the effects of individual-specific time invariant risk aversion, among other things. Due to differences in Part D's design across income levels, in this article we exclusively focus on those who did not receive federal low-income subsidies in either year.
We find consistent evidence of large improvements, with average reductions in overspending of 40-54% in one year. In addition to these large average effects, we find substantial heterogeneity, 5 Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009) present experimental evidence that individuals pay more attention to some attributes than others when presented with multiattribute financial contracts. In contrast to financial contracts, beneficiaries of Part D may revise their enrollment and choice decisions on a regular basis. We are not aware of any existing evidence, experimental or otherwise, about whether such biases persist over time.
with 80% of the study population improving from 2006 to 2007. The greatest improvements were achieved by those who overspent most in 2006, and this cannot be explained by changes in health.
Interestingly, the improvements were greatest among those age 85 and above, and those with Alzheimer's improved by about as much as the average consumer. Although we cannot observe the choice process itself, these two results suggest that populations with greater prevalence of cognitive limitations are helped by markets and other real-world features, including family members, health care providers and other private organizations, and publicly-and privately-provided decision support tools such as online plan finders.
Switching plans was a primary source of improvement, but we also find evidence of learning resulting in other sources improvement. Our analysis of switching decisions reveals that consumers respond to financial incentives and incorporate both forward-looking information about future changes in their own health as well as changes in the relative costs of their current plans.
Using data described below, Figure 1 provides descriptive results for the changes in overspending from 2006 to 2007. 7 The two panels of Figure 1 depict the distribution of potential savings for individuals that do not receive any federal low-income subsidy for premiums and copayments.
During the initial year of the program most beneficiaries overpaid between $300 and $500 dollars.
The distribution of potential savings has a long right tail, with a few beneficiaries overpaying by more than $1,000. This results in the mean overspending, $548 dollars, being almost 40% larger than the median overspending of $395 dollars. More important, however, is the contrast between the two top panels of this figure. In 2007, just one year into the program, the distribution shifts left, with substantially more beneficiaries closer to the cost-minimizing choice. Both mean and median potential savings in 2006 are cut in half in 2007, i.e., $260 and $194, respectively. 7 This analysis does not control for additional sources of heterogeneity such as medical conditions, age, or others. The empirical analysis of the rest of the article adds all those variables to show that results summarized in Figure 1 are robust to health status, age, and private information regarding own's health status changes. All variables are defined in later sections of the article. >200-300 >300-500 >500-1000 >1000-2000
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In the remainder of the article we further explore these descriptive results and their underlying causes. The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and how the key variables are defined. Section ?? evaluates how overspending changed between 2006 and 2007 overall, as well as heterogeneity in those changes across our sample. Section 4 reports how the changes vary with observed individual characteristics, such as initial overspending, age, sex, and levels and changes in health. In Section 5 we analyze the importance of various potential sources of improvement, including switching to better-matched plans, changing plan design, and tailoring drug consumption to fit the chosen plan's coverage. Section 7 follows that with an analysis of the robustness of our results to assuming perfectly inelastic demand for drugs (rather than an elasticity of -0.54 used in our main results), and, for the 2007 cross-section we evaluate plan choice based on past rather than on future drug consumption. Section ?? evaluates the participation decision, i.e., whether our enrolled population would have achieved lower costs without insurance, and we conclude in Section 8.
Data
To describe our data we first compare the features of the plans included in our sample with the universe of Part D plans available in the US. Next, we summarize how we generated each consumer's spending in each plan available to them in each year. With these estimates, we construct overspending, the key measure of plan choice in our analysis. Finally, we discuss the use of ex ante versus ex post drug consumption to evaluate improvements in overspending.
In addition to observing two years under Part D for each individual, another attractive feature of our data set is that it allows us to compute each consumers' OOP costs of the total drug bundle consumed by each beneficiary under their actual plan, which we observe with certainty, and under each alternative available in their geographical market, as well as their OOP premiums for each plan. Together these features allow us to eliminate biases due to unobserved individual heterogeneity and minimize those due to measurement error.
Study Sample
Data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), CVS Caremark (a pharmacy benefits manager, hereafter "the PBM"), and ancillary sources were used to estimate the cost of each plan to each patient in both 2006 and 2007. The PBM provided us with a large data set of its enrollees, for whom we observe their chosen plan with certainty, the universe of their claims, whether and which subsidy level they received, and their gender, age and detailed measures of health status, described below. The sample for this article plans were, on average, slightly more generous in one aspect, lower deductibles, but a less generous on other dimensions such as higher premiums and lower formulary coverage, prior authorization requirements, doughnut hole coverage, and other enhancements. In 2007, relative to all plans, our study plans became more generous in some aspects with lower premiums, lower deductibles, and more widespread provision of doughnut hole coverage for generics. At the same time, our study plans became less generous in formulary coverage and in prior authorization restrictions. The net effect of these changes is ambiguous and heterogeneous, varying with individuals' levels and types of prescription drug utilization.
The fact that our sample does not include any plans with doughnut hole coverage in 2006 may raise concerns about the generalizability of our results. For example, Abaluck and Gruber (2009) argue that an important reason why beneficiaries make mistakes in their enrollment decisions is their biased preference for expensive plans that include doughnut hole coverage. Table 1 
Estimating Overspending, Out of Pocket Costs, and Gross Costs
We use data from CMS in conjunction with the PBM data that indicate where each person lives to provide the characteristics of each plan available in each person's region in each year. These characteristics include premiums, deductibles, doughnut hole coverage, and formularies, which indicate what the beneficiaries' costs would be for every possible drug. For each person in each available plan in each year, we calculate the total OOP costs, which is defined as the sum of the OOP prescription drug costs and the plan premiums, net of any federal premium subsidies.
Throughout the article, we consider "no insurance" as one of the options that individuals may choose from, although results from analysis that exclude this option yield the same insights and implications. Appendix A details how these calculations were implemented. For the main analysis presented in this article we assume a price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs of −0.54 to allow the total amount of drugs consumed by a beneficiary to vary under different marginal drug prices. 11
With these values, we determine how the individuals' costs of the actual, chosen plan compare to all of the available alternatives. Our primary focus is on how the chosen plan compares to the person's cheapest alternative, where we refer to the difference in OOP costs between the two as "overspending". To determine how the chosen plan compares with the full distribution of plans, and not only the cheapest plan, we also calculate the chosen plan's percentile ranking in each person's distribution of available options, as well as the cost of the minimum and maximum cost options.
Through this process, we are also able to calculate two other measures for each person under each available alternative. The first is the person's non-premium OOP costs, i.e., the cost to the individual for prescription drugs alone. The second is gross spending on prescription drugs, i.e., the total amount spent by the person and the insurance plan on prescription drugs, excluding insurance premiums. In the main results we present, we allow the consumption bundle to vary with the average price in each plan, so that both the non-premium OOP costs and the gross spending vary across plans for each person. To check the sensitivity of the results to our elasticity assumption, we alternatively assumed perfectly inelastic demand, holding constant both of these cost measures across all plans at the level reported in our PBM data itself.
Ex Ante and Ex Post Costs
One important decision in analyzing how consumers' choices change over time in a context with uncertainty is adopting a perspective on what information consumers use to make their decisions.
Conceptually, consumers may rely on different levels of information with respect to uncertainty about future drug consumption. At one extreme, they may be fully myopic and utilize only their current consumption, ignoring the possibility of future changes when making choices about which plans to enroll in. At the other extreme, they may have perfect information and no uncertainty, anticipating precisely how future drug consumption will change and incorporating that into their choices of plans. Between those two are intermediate cases, in which consumers are aware of probabilities and expenses of various potential illnesses and purchase plans accordingly, but they do not know precisely whether or when they will acquire those illnesses.
While all three information sets are plausible, for both practical and conceptual reasons in the primary analysis reported here we adopt the fully-informed approach in which consumers' choices for a given year are evaluated based on their actual drug consumption in that same year. 12 We refer to this as the ex post approach, while we refer to the other extreme as the ex ante approach. Conceptually important in our context, the ex ante approach eliminates the potential for learning, as consumers may have changed their drug consumption as they learned the intricacies of PDPs. These assumptions are rejected by Tchernis, Normand, Pakes, Gaccione, and Newhouse (2006) , which presents evidence consistent with consumers having private information regarding the evolution of their own health status. They find that consumers choose plans that are more generous for treatments that they might likely need in the near future. Practically speaking, we cannot rely on the ex ante benchmark to study within-person changes over time because we do not observe individuals' drug consumption in 2005, precluding us from using it to evaluate 2006 choices. However, we compare the cross-sectional overspending results for 2007 from both the ex post and the myopic ex ante approaches in Section 7, and we find no notable differences between them.
Additional variables
The data provide several additional types of variables. First, the prescription drug claims are used to determine the health status, and changes in health status over time, for each person.
Specifically, these health measures are defined by the Ingenix Pharmacy Risk Groups (PRGs) and calculated risk scores. The risk scores are used by insurers to predict individuals' prescription drug expenditure based on their claims history and demographics. In our sample, the risk score has a mean of 5.1 and a standard deviation of 3.8. To give a sense of scale, taking medications for Alzheimer's increases the risk score by 2.8, while taking hypertension medications increases it by 1.4. The PRGs are a vector of 126 indicator variables for whether drugs were consumed for specific clinical indications. These indicators do not vary with the quantity or cost of drugs taken for a condition, but rather they simply indicate whether the individual took any drugs for each of conditions. From these, we generated dummy variables indicating which of the 15 most common PRGs in our sample in 2006 were taken by each individual. These fall into 9 illness categories that we include as dummy regressors in the second column. They are, from more to less frequently observed: hypertension, cholesterol and other cardiovascular, pain, mental health, antibiotics, anticoagulants, thyroid conditions, diabetes and osteoporosis. We also include controls for Alzheimer's disease because of its link with cognitive ability.
Second, the PBM data to permit us to identify which individuals switched plans, which plans they switched to, which they switched from, and the amount of overspending they would have incurred had they stayed in the same plan. We observe this directly from the enrollment files provided by the PBM. While this eliminates any uncertainty about the each person's actual, chosen plan, it also limits us to studying only those who were enrolled for both years in the set of plans offered or administered by the PBM.
Third, the CMS data provide details about how each plans' design changed over time as well as which plans exited and entered each region. While changes in a plan's premiums affect all consumers equally, changes in other plan attributes, such as deductibles, doughnut hole coverage, and formulary design such as copays for specific drugs, have heterogeneous effects. Thus, to understand the implications of these changes for each individual, we use these details in conjunction with the individual's prescription drug claims.
3 Within-Person Changes in Overspending, 2006 Overspending, -2007 We begin by estimating first difference regressions of overspending,
where the dependent variable ∆O it denotes the within-person change in overspending for individual i conditional on ∆H it , which is a vector of variables for the within-person changes in the measures of health, specified above, and u i is an idiosyncratic error.
The main coefficient of interest is β, which is interpreted as the average within-person change in overspending. In Table 2 we present results from four models to determine whether the results can be explained by changes in health. The first model does not control for changes in health, i.e., we exclude ∆H it , but the second model does. In the third and fourth models, we analyze only the subset of consumers with stable health, which we define in two alternate ways. In the third column, we define people in stable health if their total "risk score" changed by less than 0.5. In the fourth column, we further required that they did not change for any of the ten individual conditions that To show the degree of heterogeneity, for the sample included in each regression model we also report various points in the distribution of the unadjusted within-person change. The bottom half of the table shows the heterogeneity in these improvements. More than 80% of the sample decreased their overspending, ranging from a few dollars to amounts exceeding $1,000. At the other end of the spectrum, just under 20% overspent more in 2007 than in 2006, but the absolute value of their increases ($223) were only slightly over half of the average decreases experienced by the 80% who improved ($419).
The remaining columns of Table 2 indicate that these results are independent of changes in individual health, with similar means and distributions of improvements across all four columns.
Because of concerns about changing health in explaining our results, in the remainder of Section ??
we continue to analyze both the full population and the subset of those in stable health. Given the similarity of results with our two definitions of stable health, we rely on the more inclusive one (in column three of 
Differences in Improvement by Observed Individual Characteristics
To investigate what explains the substantial degree of heterogeneity in improvement, we begin by expanding the basic model used in the previous section to consider how the within-person changes vary by observed individual characteristics. Specifically, we estimate
where Z i includes a vector of observed time-invariant characteristics for individual i , and the remaining variables are as in equation (1). By including Z i , in these models we allow the within- with these data. These results persist in the third column, indicating that they are not simply reflecting levels or changes in total drug spending.
These results that improvements are greater among individuals' who initiated medication for a specific condition are consistent with the evidence from Tchernis et al. (2006) that patients incorporate some forward-looking information regarding the evolution of their health status when enrolling in a particular Medicare plan. Among the study sample, 94% took medications for at least one of these ten conditions. Given this high prevalence of these illnesses, our results suggest that consumers chose plans that provided generous coverage for these indications in 2006 even if they were not yet taking medications for them. If instead these individuals had chosen plans with meager coverage for these conditions, their overspending would have increased more than average, rather than decreased.
The last two columns of Table 3 
except that it includes an additional S07 term denoting that the beneficiary switched plans in 2007.
As reported in Table 4 indicating that these differences exist for reasons other than differences in the choice to switch Finally, the results suggest that differences in switching fully explain the differences observed by age and sex, which we evaluate explicitly in the next section.
We conducted two analyses to understand the sources of improvement among nonswitchers.
First, we evaluated the extent of improvement due to changes in plan design and plan availability. We repeated the model reported in Table 4 column 1 using this approach and compared the magnitude of results of this model with those in Table 4 Table 5 also show that those who switched plans and initiated medication significantly reduced their overspending more than those who did not switch. This indicates that the newly-chosen plans provided better coverage for these future illnesses than their previous plans did.
The Switching Decision
To analyze individuals' decisions about whether to switch plans, achieve this, we estimate the probit model where DeltaH i is the change in health status, as above, which in this model provides insight about individuals' use of information about future changes in health in their plan choices. As above, to the available alternatives, this variable also provides insights about whether people were forward looking in their plan choices or whether inertia causes consumers to remain in their plans despite those plans growing relatively worse over time. Table 6 presents the marginal effects from these probit models for our full sample and for the subset in stable health. As suggested by the results in Table 4 , the switching decisions differ with observed characteristics, with males 15 percentage points less likely than females, and the oldest group 39 percentage points more likely to have switched plans than those age 65-69. Because these results are conditional on health and the magnitude of overspending in 2006, they likely reflect differences in how the decision for 2007 was made, rather than differences in incentives or experience per se. The effects of the level of health status on switching also suggest that the re-enrollment decisions did not vary with experience, as captured by the number and types of conditions for which medications were taken. The probability of switching varied with the presence of a medical condition by 2 to 6 percentage points, with people with any of 8 individual conditions significantly less likely to switch plans. In contrast, greater prevalence of other illnesses captured by the risk score was associated with higher probability of switching, although those effects are small as well. improved by more than average by staying. Although these effects are generally small, they range up to 10 percentage points for mental health and five of the ten achieve significance of p < 0.05, as does the change in risk score, which summarizes health from all other conditions. If consumers did not anticipate their future illnesses and incorporate them into their decision making, then we would expect to find no significant relationships between switching and changes in health. 
Robustness of Results
In this section we consider whether the results we have reported are robust to alternative approaches.
First, we replicate the analysis but adopt the assumption that demand for prescription drugs is perfectly inelastic, as in the results reported by Abaluck and Gruber (2009) , rather than assuming an elasticity of -0.54 as in our main results. Second, we compare the 2007 cross sectional results using both our primary ex post approach as well as an alternative ex ante approach.
Assuming perfectly inelastic demand for prescription drugs
All of the preceding results allow for a quantity response to the prices of drugs under each plan.
To test the sensitivity of the results to this assumption, we replicate many of the analysis assuming perfectly inelastic demand for drugs. 
Reference Category Reference Category
those reported in Tables 2-4 Tables 3 and 4 . As before, switching plans reduced overspending, and these results are even larger than the large reductions observed under the assumption of elasticity of -0.54. Finally, the (unreported) results from probit models for switching yield marginal effects very similar to those reported in Table 5 .
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Cost Minimization
The preceding analysis all adopt an ex post approach by considering cost minimization based on the actual drug consumption, which occurred after the plan choice itself was made. To consider the sensitivity of these results to this assumption, here we instead assume that consumers' only The results in Table 8 indicate a high degree of similarity between the two approaches, both in terms of the mean as well as at various other points in the distribution of 2007 overspending.
Despite the similarity, choices appear closer to cost-minimization using the ex post rather than the ex ante approach. We find this result despite these descriptive statistics being unconditional on 
Conclusions
We analyzed Medicare Part D plan choices of older consumers who faced a potentially dizzying array of options for a complex, multiattribute product. Despite these features raising the potential for widespread consumer confusion, we found evidence that consumer choices of insurance plans, measured by overspending, improved substantially even in only one year. Further, these improvements were greatest among those who overspent most in the first year. A substantial share of these improvements were due to consumers capitalizing on the heterogeneity of available alternatives and switching into a plan more appropriate for them. Consumers' decisions to switch plans were sensitive to changes in their current plan relative to the alternatives, indicating that plans must compete to retain enrollees and cannot rely on their inertia.
Specifically, we found that the mean difference between individuals' actual choices and their cheapest options fell by about $300 while the median difference fell by about $240. The reduction in overspending varies, with those with the highest overspending in 2006 realizing the greatest reduction in 2007. We find evidence that this reduction in overspending is due to changes by individuals as well as changes in the design and availability of plans. The largest improvements were achieved by those who switched plans, indicating active effort by enrollees or someone acting on their behalf. However, even those who did not switch plans improved on average, due largely from changes in the design of their . Because we cannot observe the enrollment decision process itself with these data, we cannot determine whether the decision to remain was driven by these relative improvements, as the results from our estimates of the switching decision suggest, or whether such consumers passively received these gains that may not have been experienced by those in plans outside of our study sample. Additional research would provide a deeper understanding of the complex, dynamic relationships between supply-side changes in plan offerings and demand-side changes in enrollment decisions.
Our results provide no evidence that populations with greater prevalence of cognitive limitations, as indicated by taking medications for Alzheimer's disease or being age 85 or above, improved by less than average. In fact, the oldest consumers improved by the most, and those taking medications for Alzheimer's in both years improved by more than average. Although our data preclude us from examining the choice process directly, these results suggest that social networks, children and other relatives, medical personnel, and other organizations and decision support tools that help these patients assist these potentially vulnerable populations in choosing Part D plans.
That is, various real-world mechanisms appear to provide support to those with cognitive limitations in ways that have been omitted from the existing survey-or laboratory-based research.
Omitted from our analysis are risk aversion and uncertainty, although our analysis accounts for them as long as their individual-specific effects are time-invariant. Subsequent work that incorporates their roles will indicate whether they explain the remaining amount of observed overspending. Our results provide some evidence that consumers purchased plans that provided insurance value against common but yet unexperienced medical illnesses, suggesting that such forward-looking information may be important in these markets.
While these data offer a number of strengths, they can provide insights about only a limited scope of choices related to Part D. First, because our data include only enrollees, we cannot analyze the participation decision itself, as done by Heiss et al. (2007) . Second, we analyze the choice of In addition to the high enrollment found by Joyce et al. (2009 ), Duggan et al. (2008 report that Part D has reduced pharmaceutical prices, increased the utilization of prescription drugs, and reduced medical expenditure risk, all at a substantially lower cost for the government than initially expected. Furthermore, although Heiss et al. (2006) initially questioned whether a government run program could have more effectively controlled for the cost of drugs, they later concluded that Part D has been a tactical success that has induced high enrollment levels, ensured competition among private insurance sponsors, and kept drug prices and rates of consumer deception low (Heiss et al. (2007) ).
One implication for Part D specifically is that cross-sectional analysis and subsequent policy recommendations based on new and evolving markets (Abaluck and Gruber (2009) ) overlook the importance of experience and market responses in ameliorating biases in consumer choices (List (2003) ). As Part D has developed, consumers had greater access to information through plan ratings, user-friendly websites, and software applications of pharmacy chains and other institutions to help people choose well-matching plans. However, these sources of information did not appear overnight when Medicare Part D was first implemented. Rather, the market for information itself grew in response to the new and greater demand for it. 15
Both within and beyond health care, repeated evidence that choice overwhelms consumers and leads to poor matches between consumers and products will support policies such as strengthening consumer protection rules or requiring a simplification of credit cards, mortgages, or health insurance contracts. Alternatively, evidence that consumers can discern among multiple complex alternatives would indicate that policies that reduce barriers to entry and promote competition, freedom of choice, and the provision of heterogeneous products will enhance welfare, including an increase overall the value of health care spending. Unfortunately, the evidence supporting consumers' inabilities to choose their health insurance plans appropriately has been obtained using only cross-sectional data that often abstracts from the actual choice process. 16 By providing an analysis of a large individual panel database in an economically-meaningful environment, we contribute to this debate by focusing on the evolution of consumers' performance over time.
One challenge to researchers examining consumers' actual Part D plan choices is that the CMS formulary file does not provide all required information in cases where patients paid the full cost, as under the deductible or doughnut hole, or some fraction of it, as with coinsurance. Specifically, the formulary files do not provide the underlying prices of each drug in each available plan to which the coinsurance would be applied. 20 We relied on a range of data sources to provide these underlying prices. First, we used Wolters Kluwer Health Source LX claims data to generate an average price per unit (e.g., day's supply) for each of the Food and Drug Administration's National Drug Code (NDC) in each plan by quarter, region, and pharmacy type (retail or mail service). To do this, indicators in the Wolters Kluwer Health data were cleaned and used to generate these measures at the level of the PDP parent company. Individual plan identifiers are not available in these data, but the prices we need do not vary across plans within a parent organization, which we confirmed by examining "scraper" data from the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan finder website for 2006 as in Simon and Lucarelli (2006) . These scraper data captured the price per unit for 400 common drugs for each plan in 2006.
Because the WKH data did not provide all of these underlying prices needed to estimate costs for each person in each available plan, we relied on the scraper data for most of the additional prices. Where needed, we multiplied the coinsurance rate by the average unit price from either of these two sources for the given NDC, quarter, region and pharmacy type. 21, 22 To validate this approach of determining each person's total OOP spending in each available plan, we compared the total spending for the person's actual plan derived from this simulation method with that directly observed from the PBM data. The correlation coefficient between these was 0.77, with a median difference of $0 and a mean difference of $146 (with the average simulated costs being higher). The simulated costs were greater than the actual costs for 56% of the sample. This suggests that our method for estimating spending in counterfactual plans was highly accurate.
We also included not enrolling as a possible option to the choice set. One benefit of including this alternative is that it limits the extent to which any observed improvements in plan choice can be ascribed to exit or redesign of the lowest-cost plans. For this "no insurance" option, premiums were $0 and drug costs were determined by the usual and customary price, which is what the pharmacy would have charged a cash-paying customer.
